Reform or repeat: the battle for Hungary’s media future begins now

Hungary’s incoming leadership has a rare opportunity to rebuild a distorted media system, but only if it embraces transparency, curbs political influence and redefines the role of public broadcasting

Hungarian election night, 12th April, 2026. Photo: Tomas Benedikovic

In recent days I’ve found myself writing or saying the word “historic” more often than in the previous 46 years combined. But it really is historic: Hungary’s media landscape has been given a new chance to function more freely, more healthily and in a more balanced way.

I quickly thought through the key questions facing the Tisza government when it comes to reforming the media landscape. Here are a few ideas.

1. Let the new government approach media reform with respect for voters

Let it be the first government in post-transition Hungarian history to uphold the values essential to quality journalism: transparency, accountability, critical scrutiny, balance, accuracy and fair representation. It must understand that the journalist’s primary role is to inform—and to hold power, including the government, to account.

A journalist asks questions on behalf of the voter. They are not a crony, not an intrusive nuisance, not an enemy, but a professional performing a vital democratic function. They are present wherever things happen—the extended hand, eye and ear of citizens—asking the public-interest questions that concern everyone.

The government does not need to like journalists, newspapers or media outlets. Nor do media organisations need to ingratiate themselves with the government. The task is for all sides to recognise and accept each other’s role and function, and to respect this democratic foundation.

If the new government respects these values and does not seek at all costs to restrict free information flow, questioning and oversight, everything will already improve.

2. Shape, intelligently, the structural framework governing independent media actors

Balance state advertising spending, and eliminate the absurd, market-distorting situation in which vast public advertising budgets flow to friendly outlets while others receive nothing.

The Sovereignty Protection Office—created to harass the media—should be shut down immediately, and its substantial funding redirected to better purposes. The law designed to make independent media unviable should be treated as a bad dream of the past.

If the new government distributes budget funds to commercially operating media, it must do so wisely. The Tisza party’s 200-page political programme mentions the creation of a “politically neutral National Press Fund to support print and digital journalism”. No details have yet been provided, but one might imagine something akin to the Danish model. There, part of the public broadcaster’s content budget is spent on commissioning independent production companies. This stimulates the creative market and prevents the public broadcaster from becoming an isolated ivory tower—but in this region of the world there is always a risk it could quickly become another channel for favouritism. In an ideal scenario, if the proposed National Press Fund allocates resources according to clear, well-designed rules, commercial media actors could apply for support for more expensive formats (such as audiovisual content). This can work well if it complements private market financing rather than replacing it—supporting viable projects, not keeping audience-less, uninteresting content on life support.

The advertising tax would further distort an already damaged market—so, put simply: do not reintroduce it. Tisza has not yet clarified its position, though larger media companies are likely watching developments with considerable anxiety. The advertising tax is a targeted levy on media companies, publishers and platforms based on their net advertising revenues. Entities subject to it include broadcasters and online platforms. The rate is 7.5% on revenue above 100 million forints, with the portion below that exempt. It is currently suspended (0%), but could in principle return at 7.5% from 1 July 2026—something that would significantly hurt large companies. It is particularly disadvantageous for large media firms because it is revenue-based: high advertising income results in substantial tax burdens, reducing profitability and creating a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis smaller firms and global platform giants (Meta, Google and others), which already distort and, in many ways, dominate the media market.

On that note, the state should act as a partner to media companies in negotiations—and conflicts—with global platforms, and actively support, together with media actors, the enforcement of EU media regulations.

3. Public media must be completely overhauled, says Péter Magyar. True—but how matters enormously

Hungary has never really had a strong public broadcaster under any government, but the past 16 years have represented a particularly deep nadir. For public media to function in the long term as more than a government mouthpiece, a solid wall must be erected between journalism, content production and funding.

I will not dwell here on the problems of the current, government-aligned and heavily skewed public media output, or the fact that Péter Magyar—despite his historic electoral victory—was invited into public media for the first time only after a year and a half. The situation speaks for itself.

Instead, let’s focus on the system. Public media should not be conceived primarily along traditional television and radio lines, but rather as a digital content platform.

Traditional formats remain necessary—especially for older audiences—but equally important is accurate, fast and fair news provision, alongside cultural, historical, social and public affairs programming in the digital space. Particularly since Hungary’s remarkably resilient independent press has accustomed millions to seeking information online.

Why maintain separate radio, online and television newsrooms, alongside a vast state news agency monopoly? The Estonian example shows these can be integrated into a single, cost-efficient, advertisement-free organisation.

And how can independence be ensured if politicians ultimately decide funding levels?

The principle of distance must be carefully designed. Public service principles and rules must be clearly defined; leadership should be selected through open, transparent tenders; and it must be accepted that their work will sometimes be unpopular.

Following thorough consultation across society and the profession, a long-term—say, five-year—agreement should be established (as in Denmark) between the relevant ministry and public media. This would prevent day-to-day political interference while maintaining accountability to citizens. It would amount to a kind of truce: the political side provides funding and jointly defined public service frameworks, but refrains from interfering in implementation for five years. Leadership changes during the contract period should be possible only in cases of serious code violations or clear misconduct (such as corruption).

Such an agreement could also stipulate, for example, that a large share of the budget must be spent on content production—not on real estate, patronage or administrative overheads. It could also define measurable indicators relating to balance, public service values and impact, reported transparently each year.

If funding continues to come from the state budget, it would be worth introducing a buffer between money and editorial work. In Germany, this role is played by the KEF (Commission for Determining the Financial Needs of Broadcasters): a 16-member expert body—economists, lawyers, auditors—that reviews public media business plans and recommends funding levels.

And it would be wise to build the new public media gradually. There is no need to pour hundreds of billions into it again.

What do you think about all this?